Strategic commitment and cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes by Embrey, M.S. et al.
  
 
Strategic commitment and cooperation in
experimental games of strategic complements and
substitutes
Citation for published version (APA):
Embrey, M. S., Mengel, F., & Peeters, R. J. A. P. (2012). Strategic commitment and cooperation in
experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes. (METEOR research memorandum; No.
051). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2012
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Matthew Embrey, Friederike Mengel, 
Ronald Peeters 
 
Strategic commitment and 
cooperation in experimental 
games of strategic complements 
and substitutes 
 
RM/12/051 
 
 
Strategic commitment and cooperation in experimental games
of strategic complements and substitutes∗
Matthew Embrey† Friederike Mengel‡,§ Ronald Peeters¶
October 2012
Abstract
We study the impact of strategic commitment on cooperation in indefinitely repeated
games of strategic substitutes (Cournot) and complements (Bertrand) using laboratory
experiments. Overall, strategic commitment has no effect on cooperation with strate-
gic substitutes and a negative one with strategic complements. In the absence of strong
strategic commitment, we find more cooperation in the complements game than in the
substitutes game. However, when subjects are more committed to initial plans, a higher
level of cooperation is achieved with strategic substitutes. These results cannot be ex-
plained by standard risk-dominance or renegotiation considerations, but are consistent
with a notion of fear of miscoordination based on minmax regret.
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1 Introduction
By strategic commitment, we refer to the extent to which players in repeated games can,
either unilaterally or bilaterally, revise their strategies during the course of play. Strategic
commitment plays an important role in many situations of interest. Corporations need to de-
termine the extent to which they wish to regulate franchises “top down” or to allow revisions
to, for example, pricing strategies in response to local market conditions.1 Policy makers and
regulators can influence the possibility of orchestrated strategy revisions, including renegoti-
ation, via legal restrictions on meetings and agreements between market participants. Some
instances of antitrust legislation provide good examples of such policies (see, for example,
McCutcheon, 1997).
The role of strategic commitment has not been given much attention in the literature on
repeated games thus far. In particular, it plays no role in (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium.
This concept has been refined in the renegotiation literature by focusing on one particular
aspect of strategic commitment, namely the possibility that some paths may be renegotiated
at a later date should they be reached. This can affect equilibria where the threat of pun-
ishment tomorrow is used to sustain more cooperative behavior today. Loosely speaking, if
players anticipate renegotiation of such punishment paths, then punishment may no longer
be credible and, as a consequence, collusion no longer sustainable.
This paper studies the impact of strategic commitment on cooperative behavior, referred
to as collusion, in infinitely repeated games. We do this by means of a laboratory experiment
where the level of strategic commitment is exogenously varied across treatments. Our exper-
iment systematically varies the ease with which participants can revise their strategy during
the course of a repeated game, isolating the effect of such strategic commitment while keeping
other, potentially confounding, factors constant, such as the size of the stakes, the strategy
sets, the number of players and the incentives to deviate. Hence, strategic commitment in
our study does not entail moving from simultaneous to sequential games, nor moving from
“bigger” to “smaller” strategy spaces. In addition, our design elicits information about the
strategies participants use in the repeated game, allowing us to define and identify changes in
strategy and observe intended behavior off the realized outcome path. Since different refine-
ments for indefinitely repeated games entail different predictions on how increasing the level of
strategic commitment affects collusion, our experiment is able to discriminate between these.
In particular, renegotiation proofness predicts a weak increase in collusion as commitment
increases, while a notion of “fear of miscoordination”, that we define precisely below, predicts
a weak decrease in collusion as commitment increases.
In the experiment, participants play an indefinitely repeated game where the stage game is
1McDonalds typically allows local restaurants to unilaterally deviate from pricing strategies (nationwide
commercials involving prices usually have the caveat “in participating restaurants” attached). Ikea does not
allow local stores in Germany to price articles higher than indicated in the nationwide catalogue. Lower prices
are allowed in some cases.
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either a game of strategic substitutes or of strategic complements. The stage games are derived
from equivalent linear duopoly games (Cournot and Bertrand respectively) and reduced to
symmetric, normal-form games in which both players have four actions to choose from. The
demand systems and action sets are chosen so that the resulting payoff matrices are as close as
possible: they have identical diagonal elements (including the collusion and Nash outcomes),
as well as identical temptation and sucker payoffs. The games primarily differ in the location
of the deviation action. In the substitutes game, the deviation action is less cooperative than
the Nash action, while in the complements game it is more cooperative than the Nash action.
At the beginning of a supergame, participants program a strategy by choosing an initial
action choice and a dynamic response machine, which specifies a recommended action in re-
sponse to their rival’s previous action choice. Four levels of strategic commitment determine
the extent to which participants are committed to their programmed strategies. These levels
are labelled as the strong, unilateral, bilateral and hot variations. In all variations, partici-
pants can deviate from their recommendation using one-shot deviations. This possibility is
included so that participants have the full strategy space of the repeated game available. In
the first three variations, such a deviation comes at a small cost; in the hot treatment, it
is costless. Strategic commitment differs across treatments as follows. In the unilateral and
bilateral variations, dynamic responses can also be modified at a small cost. In the unilateral
variation, this modification can be done without explicit consent of one’s rival; in the bilateral
variation, explicit consent is required. In the strong commitment variation, machines cannot
be modified. The main variations for considering the impact of strategic commitment on
cooperation are the strong and unilateral variations. The purpose of the bilateral variation –
which in terms of the level of commitment, should be positioned between the main variations
– is to further investigate the possible functioning of renegotiation. The hot variation is used
to empirically evaluate (by comparing it to the unilateral variation) whether the small costs
we impose on one-shot deviations and machine changes distort our participants’ choice of
strategies.
We find that strategic commitment has no effect on cooperation under strategic substi-
tutes, yet has a significant, negative effect under strategic complements. The second effect
is large enough to reverse the ranking of collusion rates between interaction types: there is
more cooperation under strategic substitutes when strategic commitment is weak, while the
opposite is true when strategic commitment is strong. Neither standard risk dominance nor
considerations of renegotiation can explain these results. Given the large multiplicity of equi-
libria in these games, it is intuitive that fear of miscoordination might play an important role.
We define a notion of “fear of miscoordination”, based on minmax regret, and show that it
yields predictions consistent with our main results.
In terms of the strategies participants use, we find that most use machines that are
familiar from the literature. The most prominent machines mimic the always-Nash, myopic-
best-response, tit-for-tat and Nash-reversion strategies. Participants tend to use machines
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less often the higher the “fear of miscoordination” associated with these machines. While
generally “fear of miscoordination” tends to have more bite under strategic complements,
there is another crucial difference between complements and substitutes: Identifying defectors
is more ambiguous under strategic complements than under substitutes, since partial collusion
is also the action associated with deviation under the former.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature; Section 3 outlines
the experimental design and states our conjectures; Section 4 covers the data analysis; Sec-
tion 5 provides a discussion of the results and contrasts alternative explanations, while a final
section concludes. The appendices contain additional complementary material.
2 Related literature
Our research bridges two literatures that have each received some attention in recent years
but have, to the best of our knowledge, not been brought together: namely, strategic com-
mitment (including renegotiation) and the type of strategic interaction (strategic substitutes
versus complements). The first two subsections relate our work to prior research in each of
these areas. The third subsection relates our work to the experimental literature on strategy
elicitation in infinitely repeated games.
2.1 Strategic commitment
Much of the theoretical literature on strategic commitment deals with renegotiation. The the-
ory of renegotiation argues that, in some cases, collusion may not be sustainable by strategies,
such as grim-trigger, that include punishment paths that agents would want to “renegotiate”
should they be reached. This makes such punishments no longer credible. That is, if there
are possibilities for renegotiation, there should be weakly less collusion under weak commit-
ment than under strong commitment, where such renegotiation is not possible. The two most
well-known concepts of renegotiation theory are the weak renegotiation proof equilibrium of
Farrell and Maskin (1989) and the consistent bargaining equilibrium of Abreu, Pearce, and
Stachetti (1993). As long as future payoffs are not discounted “too much”, collusion is weakly
renegotiation proof under both Cournot and Bertrand competition (Aramendia, Larrea, and
Ruiz, 2005).
McCutcheon (1997) applies the idea of costly renegotiation to antitrust legislation on
meetings between rivals to discuss prices. The idea is that, if meeting is costly, but not
prohibitively so, then firms may be willing to meet to initiate collusion, but not to renegotiate
punishment paths. As a consequence, antitrust legislation, without sufficient sanctioning, may
actually facilitate collusion.2 This finding, together with the papers mentioned in the former
2There is a recent strand of the experimental literature on cooperation/collusion explicitly investigating
the role of communication. Fonseca and Normann (2012), Andersson and Wengstro¨m (2012) and Cooper and
Kuhn (2012) all study renegotiation with communication and find mixed results as to whether communication,
and the timing of communication, leads to more collusion or not.
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paragraph, will form the basis of one of our alternative conjectures.
There is less experimental research on strategic commitment. Mengel and Peeters (2011)
have a “semi-hot” treatment (hot but with small costs) and a “strong commitment” treatment
in a study comparing contributions by partners and strangers in a repeated public good game.
Their reason for eliciting strategies is that it controls for path-dependencies (impact of initial
states) in this comparison. Huck, Mu¨ller, and Normann (2002) study commitment in a two-
stage Cournot duopoly, where players can endogenously choose to commit to a quantity in the
first stage or to postpone their strategic decision to the second stage. As mentioned earlier, we
do not study such endogenous commitment choices, where players turn simultaneous move
games into sequential games. There is also a literature comparing the so-called “strategy
method” with “hot” treatments in sequential games. We will survey some of this literature in
Subsection 2.3. To the best of our knowledge, the effect of strategic commitment in indefinitely
repeated games has not been the subject of an experimental study before.
2.2 Type of strategic interaction
The concepts of strategic substitutes and complements were introduced by Bulow, Geneako-
plos, and Klemperer (1985). There is little theory on the impact of the type of strategic
interaction on collusion. According to the standard theory of infinitely repeated games, collu-
sion is sustainable under both types of interaction whenever future payoffs are not discounted
“too much” (see, for example, Mailath and Samuelson, 2005). The two games in our experi-
ment are designed so that the minimal discount factors required to sustain collusion are the
same in both games.
Potters and Suetens (2009) study collusion in a laboratory experiment using finitely re-
peated games of strategic substitutes and complements. With a design that varies whether the
stage game is price or quantity competition and whether duopolists’ actions exert a positive or
negative externality on their rivals, they find more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic
complementarities. As all their treatments are within a framework of “hot” decision making,
their results are best compared to our unilateral or hot variations where the level of strategic
commitment is low. As will be seen, our results with a low level of strategic commitment
confirm theirs. However, when the level of strategic commitment is high, we find the opposite
is true: there is more collusion with strategic substitutes. Consequently, whether strategic
complementarity or substitutability is more conducive to collusion appears to depend on the
level of strategic commitment. In addition, our data on the dynamic responses of participants
give us information on the strategies being used, providing further insight into the underlying
reasons for the observed treatment rankings.
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2.3 Strategy elicitation in infinitely repeated games
A prominent study of strategies in an infinitely repeated game, with strong commitment, is
the Axelrod tournament (Axelrod, 1984).3 In our study we are primarily interested in which
strategies people actually use, and not in which strategies perform best in such contests.
Those questions generally have different answers, since other motives than pure performance
can play a role and impact behavior. We decided not to do a tournament or simulation study
since those formats are not well suited to studying renegotiation or strategic commitment
more generally.
Selten, Mitzkewitz, and Ulrich (1997) is an early example of strategy elicitation in a
repeated-game environment. They let participants of a student seminar program strategies for
a finitely (3-period) repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under “strong commitment conditions”
after a “hot” phase that lasted 3 periods as well. Their main finding is that “subjects first
select an ‘ideal point’, a cooperative goal based on fairness criteria, and then design a ‘measure
for measure policy’ that reciprocates movements to the ideal point or away from it”.
In a recent study, Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011b) elicit strategies in an infinitely repeated-
game environment. They consider, as we do, one-period histories and ask participants to
specify choices in the 2×2 prisoner’s dilemma game for each of the 4 possible one-period
histories. In their design, the programmed strategy is initially irrelevant for choices as partic-
ipants choose as in a “hot” treatment. After 20 minutes, the strategy takes over and, hence,
from then on there is “strong commitment”. Their main findings are that participants use
strategies we are familiar with from the literature (such as tit-for-tat), and that behavior in
the “hot” phase and behavior implied by the strategies programmed in the “strong commit-
ment phase” are not significantly different. Their study relates most closely to our treatments
with strategic substitutes, and their findings are in line with ours for this case: participants
use strategies we know from the literature, the distribution of strategies do not significantly
differ across different levels of strategic commitment and there are no significant differences
in (implied) behavior between the “hot” and “strong commitment” cases.
The strategies participants could programme in our experiment differ from those in Dal Bo´
and Fre´chette (2011b). This difference is a consequence of the 4×4 stage games we use –
a setting with less than four actions would not have allowed a clean distinction between
substitutes and complements. With 4 actions, we decided not to ask participants to program
a response for each of the 16 possible outcomes from the previous stage, but instead only for
the 4 possible action choices of their rival. Such a strategy elicitation method is also used in
Mengel and Peeters (2011). Unlike Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011b), they find some differences
between a strong commitment case and a “costly hot” case, suggesting that whether or not
strategic commitment has an effect on behavior depends, apart from the mechanism used to
elicit strategies, on the type of game (strategic substitutes or complements) considered.
3See also the many subsequent studies, for example Nowak and Sigmund (1990).
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A number of studies aim explicitly to test the validity of the strategy method. The results
from this literature are quite mixed. For example, Brosig and Yang (2003) find significant
differences between a strategy method treatment and a hot treatment in bargaining games.
In contrast, Brandts and Charness (2000) do not find significant differences in a prisoners’
dilemma game and a hawk-dove game. As none of these studies concern repeated games, and
it is hard to interpret their strategy methods as implying more strategic commitment, we
implemented a hot treatment for benchmarking purposes.
3 The experiment
Our 4× 2 design has four levels of strategic commitment and two types of strategic interac-
tion. This section provides a detailed specification of the treatment variables and how the
different levels/types were implemented in the laboratory, the experimental procedures and
the conjectures that follow from the predictions of different theories.
3.1 Design
Participants play one of two possible games that differ in the type of strategic interaction:
strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Table 1 presents the payoff-matrices of the two
stage games (with ECU being the prevailing currency).
A B C D
A 43, 43 31, 51 25, 52 23, 54
B 51, 31 36, 36 32, 40 29, 38
C 52, 25 40, 32 33, 33 31, 32
D 54, 23 38, 29 32, 31 30, 30
Strategic substitutes.
A B C D
A 43, 43 23, 54 14, 52 7, 47
B 54, 23 36, 36 32, 40 28, 37
C 52, 14 40, 32 33, 33 31, 32
D 47, 7 37, 28 32, 31 30, 30
Strategic complements.
Table 1: The two stage games in the experiment.
The structure and payoffs of the games are designed so that, while each game has a natural
duopoly analogue, the two are as identical as possible. To provide this analogue, the com-
plements game is a discretized version of a differentiated-goods linear Bertrand duopoly and
the substitutes game a discretized version of a differentiated-goods linear Cournot duopoly.
In both cases, the duopolists produce differentiated-goods that are product substitutes. To
ensure a fair comparison across games, the underlying duopoly games were calibrated so that
the majority of payoffs for key action pairs are identical across games: First, the Nash equi-
librium payoffs that result from both players playing action C are identical. Second, the joint
payoff maximizing payoffs that result from both choosing action A are identical. Third and
fourth, the optimal deviation against the co-player playing action A, which requires playing
action B in the complements game and action D in the substitutes game, yields the same
payoff for the defector and the sucker across games. Fifth and sixth, the remaining actions
7
in the games, action D for the complements game and action B for the substitutes game, are
such that all diagonal elements are identical across games.4
The crucial difference between the two games is the location of the optimal deviation
against the co-player playing the joint payoff maximizing action, which is action B with
strategic complements and action D with strategic substitutes. Consequently, the optimal
deviation action is located between the collusive action (A) and the Nash action (C) in the
complements game, whereas it is located beyond the Nash action in the substitutes game.
In terms of the underlying Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, these deviations correspond
to, respectively, a small price undercut and an increase in supply beyond the competitive
level. The difference in the location of these actions is the primary difference between the
games; a difference that will prove to have a significant interaction with the level of strategic
commitment. For convenience, we will refer to the actions A, B, C and D as respectively
Collusion, Dev.SC, Nash and Dev.SS.
By construction, collusion is not an equilibrium outcome of these one-shot games. Infinite
repetition of a game, with future payoffs being exponentially discounted, introduces equilibria
in which players can sustain collusion by providing intertemporal incentives to cooperate. To
mimic this environment in the laboratory, participants play an indefinitely repeated game,
where, after a stage has been played, the super-game is randomly terminated using a fixed
continuation probability equal to the discount factor.5 The continuation probability is cho-
sen so that collusion can be sustained (in a Nash equilibrium) in either game via well-know
strategies such as grim-trigger and tit-for-tat. The minimal discount factor needed for those
strategies to sustain collusion is the same in both games and the chosen continuation proba-
bility of δ = 7/8 is above this level.
At the beginning of a repeated game, participants are asked to specify an intended strategy.
This strategy consists of an initial action, to be played in the first stage, and a programmed
machine, which recommends at each later stage an action conditional on their co-player’s
action in the previous stage. The machine is denoted by a quadruple zAzBzCzD specifying
which action zk ∈ {A,B,C,D} the machine is programmed to play if the opponent has
chosen action k ∈ {A,B,C,D} in the previous stage. An intended strategy is denoted by
z∅− zAzBzCzD, where the first element refers to the initial action choice. The most general
strategy one can formulate in such a repeated game maps any possible history of observed
action profiles into actions. In this design, however, participants’ intended strategies are
restricted so that actions can only be conditioned on their co-player’s action in the previous
stage. Some examples of familiar strategies that can be programmed are: unconditional
cooperation (A–AAAA), tit-for-tat (A–ABCD), (forgiving) Nash reversion (A–ACCC), and
4After rounding the payoffs to numbers, one unit of payoff was added to some payoffs in order to avoid
degeneracies that are caused by rounding. This is done in such a way that games become even more similar:
for instance, this led to the box formed by actions B and C and that formed by actions C and D being identical
across games.
5This approach follows Roth and Murnighan (1978).
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always Nash (C–CCCC). A well-known machine that cannot be programmed is grim-trigger,
since the ACCC-machine that comes closest reverts to cooperation if the co-player chooses to
cooperate in some stage following a deviation.
In all treatments, participants are allowed to take an action that differs from the one rec-
ommended by their machine. Such changes are referred to as one-shot deviations. In addition,
it is possible for participants to modify their machines in some treatments. Consequently,
more general strategies, such as grim-trigger, become feasible to implement, either via a ma-
chine modification (for example, from ADDD to DDDD) or via a series of one-shot deviations.
Allowing for one-shot deviations ensures that the full strategy space is available for partici-
pants in all treatments. The ease with which machine changes can be made determines the
level of commitment to intended strategies, and is our second treatment variation.
Participants face the most commitment to their intended strategies in the treatments la-
beled strong. Here, participants keep their machines for the entire duration of the repeated
game, and can only deviate from the recommendations of their machines via one-shot de-
viations. The least amount commitment comes in the treatments labeled unilateral. Here,
participants can modify their machines after any stage of the repeated game. In terms of
the level of strategic commitment, the third variation – labeled bilateral – ranks in between
the other two. Here, participants can modify their machines if and only if consent to a
modification has been given by their co-player.
To provide participants with an incentive to program their machines (strategies) carefully,
one-shot deviations and machine modifications have a small cost associated with them. Each
one-shot deviation costs 3 ECU; each machine modification 1 ECU, irrespective of the number
of elements of the machine that are changed. Choosing the costs in such a manner we hoped
to ensure that playing with a poorly programmed strategy is much more costly under strong
commitment (where one needs to rely on one-shot deviations) than under weak commitment
where machine changes are possible.
To verify that behavior was not unduly affected by the costs placed on implementing more
general strategies, a fourth treatment variation – labeled hot – was implemented. In this
variation, the cost of one-shot deviations was set to zero, resulting in no monetary incentive
for participants to stick to the recommendation of their machine. This treatment gives the
same degree of strategic flexibility as the unilateral variation, except now the flexibility comes
for free. Any differences between the hot and unilateral variation would indicate that costs
for one-shot deviations and machine changes might be distorting behavior. As is shown in
Appendix B, behavior in these two treatment variations is very similar in terms of the amount
of collusion, the level of joint profits, the distribution of machines used by participants and
the dynamics of behavior within and across matches.
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3.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted in the BEElab at Maastricht University during October–
December 2011. 352 students were recruited using Orsee (Greiner, 2004) and participated in
one of the eight treatments.6 During each session, three matching groups were run in parallel
on separate z-Tree servers (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted an hour and a half on average,
including a twenty minute instruction period.7 On average participants earned between 12.60
and 15.30 Euro for their participation.8
For the strong, unilateral and bilateral commitment variations, six matching groups were
run; for the hot variations, four matching groups were run. Each matching group comprised
eight participants that all played the repeated game (of the same treatment) ten times. At the
beginning of a match, as a single repeated game is referred to, participants within a matching
group were randomly paired. At the end of a session, participants were paid in cash according
to the amount of ECUs they earned in one randomly drawn match.
Participants were fully informed about all details of the decision task, the environment
and procedures in the experimental instructions (see Appendix A for an example of the in-
structions). Participants were never informed of the machine employed by other participants,
but instead observed the history of play. That is, after every stage they were updated about
their own and the action choices of the person they were matched with from the previous
stage and the resulting payoffs.
For all members in a matching group, any given match consisted of the same number
of stages, but this number changed across matches. Across matching groups this sequence
of match-lengths differed. However, to facilitate a good comparison between treatments,
the same sequences were used for the different matching groups of each treatment. Table 2
presents these sequences for the different matching groups that are indexed in order of in-
creasing total number of stages.
3.3 Conjectures
The first series of conjectures concern the predictions of existing theories for the impact of
strategic commitment on collusion. The first conjecture is formulated on the basis of stan-
dard (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium. By design, trigger strategies can sustain collusion
in all treatments – even the necessary and sufficient conditions on discount factors (contin-
uation probabilities) for trigger strategies to support collusion are identical for all levels of
commitment. Hence, there should be no effect of strategic commitment on collusion.
6Other than the treatments mentioned we did not conduct any additional treatments. We conducted one
pilot session with a 6x6 game, after which we decided to switch to a 4x4 game to reduce complexity for
participants and hence the duration of the experiment. Other than this session we did not conduct any other
pilot studies.
7Due to the randomness in the length of the matches, subjects were recruited for up to 2 hours. No session
lasted longer than 1 hour and 45 minutes.
8See Table 3 for a detailed summary of the treatments.
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Matching Match
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1 13 8 1 4 1 5 20 7 8 2 69
2 1 4 3 4 15 18 15 6 2 2 70
3 10 10 10 8 3 2 2 13 11 12 81
4 9 5 8 10 9 4 12 12 18 4 91
5 2 1 9 14 15 14 3 8 20 6 92
6 6 4 6 8 3 11 8 26 19 7 98
Table 2: Number of stages played in the ten matches for the six different matching groups.
Conjecture A-0 (SPNE) Strategic commitment should not have an impact on collusion
(irrespective of the type of strategic interaction).
The second conjecture is based on the notion of renegotiation. While for duopolies like those
considered in our paper, existing concepts of renegotiation-proofness do not rule out collusion,
still a clear intuition can be derived from this literature.9 For instance, McCutcheon (1997)
argues that if competitors are sufficiently committed to their strategies, we should see more
collusion. The idea is that punishment paths cannot (or are too costly to) be renegotiated,
making the threat of punishments credible and thus deterring prospective defectors. As a
result, competitors have sufficient mutual confidence in being able to sustain collusion.
Conjecture A-1 (Renegotiation) There should be weakly less collusion in treatments
with a lower level of commitment (the unilateral and bilateral variations) than in treatments
with a higher level of commitment (the strong variations).
Our third conjecture is based on a notion of “fear of miscoordination”. Given the large number
of possible equilibria in these indefinitely repeated games, fear of miscoordination seems a
particularly relevant concern and its effect may overshadow potential effects of renegotiation.
In fact, as we will see fear of miscoordination ranks the treatments in exactly the opposite
way compared to renegotiation. To define the fear of miscoordination for a player i using
repeated game strategy s∗i , we use the maximal regret possible for this strategy; i.e. pii(s
∗
i , s
∗
i )−
mins−i pii(s
∗
i , s−i), where pii(si, s−i) denotes player i’s expected payoffs if she plays repeated
game strategy si and her opponent plays according to s−i. Notice that this definition is
formulated from the perspective of a symmetric equilibrium, which is sufficient for the purpose
of this study.10 Following this definition, fear of miscoordination is always higher for strategies
9For details, see the paragraph following Conjecture B-1.
10Defining this notion for all equilibria would require knowledge about which equilibria can be supported by
any given strategy. Chassang (2010) has used fear of miscoordination in a weaker sense. He studies dynamic
global games and refers to fear of miscoordination as the possibility of miscoordination arising from a lack of
common knowledge and in particular arbitrarily small amounts of private knowledge. His characterization of
sequentially rationalizable strategies is related to risk dominance in the one-shot game and thus, unsurprisingly,
quite different from ours.
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attempting to establish collusion than for strategies attempting to play Nash.11
In the literature it is not uncommon to assume that players choose strategies to minimize
ex ante regret (see, for example, Bergemann and Schlag, 2008). We remain agnostic about the
precise decision rules that players follow, and just assume that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood
of using a strategy is nonincreasing in the ex ante regret – or, the fear of miscoordination
– associated with that strategy. This assumption is sufficient to draw the conclusion that
fear of miscoordination predicts players to be more willing to collude if there is less strategic
commitment, since maximal regret is always (weakly) lower if a player can adapt her strategy
than if she cannot.
Conjecture A-2 (Fear of miscoordination) There should be weakly more collusion in
the treatments with a lower level of commitment (the unilateral and bilateral variations)
than in the treatments with a higher level of commitment (the strong variations).
The second series of conjectures concern predictions of existing theory for the impact of type
of strategic interaction on collusion. Since the stage games have been designed to minimize
their differences, standard theory does not predict a difference in outcomes.
Conjecture B-0 (SPNE) and B-1 (Renegotiation) The type of strategic interaction,
substitutes or complements, should not have an impact on collusion for any variation of
the level of commitment.
The theory of renegotiation does not discriminate between our two games, as can be seen easily
e.g. in Theorem 1 in Farrell and Maskin (1989) or Proposition 4.6.2 in Mailath and Samuelson
(2005). Collusion is renegotiation proof (according to WRPE) in both games studied here,
since maxai∈Ai pii(ai, D) = 31 < 43 and pi−i(A,D) = 54 > 43. This leads to Conjecture B-1
above. In fact, for collusion to no longer be renegotiation-proof, for any discount rate, it
is necessary to include a larger number of firms than duopoly, as well as to strengthen the
concept of Farrell and Maskin (1989). See Farrell (2000) for the case of Bertrand competition
and Aramendia, Larrea, and Ruiz (2005) for the case of Cournot competition.
In contrast to renegotiation, fear of miscoordination creates a wedge in the relative attrac-
tiveness of collusive strategies between the two types of strategic interaction. Assume a player
chooses a strategy intended to achieve cooperation. Irrespective of whether she uses a condi-
tionally cooperative strategy (such as A–ACCC or A–ABCD) or unconditionally cooperative
strategy (such as A–AAAA), fear of miscoordination is higher with strategic complements
than with strategic substitutes.12 As argued earlier, the role of fear of miscoordination should
11The maximal regret with Nash strategy C–CCCC is 2 1
1−δ in both games. The maximal regret from the
collusive strategy A–ABCD, for example, is 36 + 13 δ
1−δ with strategic complements and 20 + 13
δ
1−δ with
strategic substitutes.
12The maximal regret from the collusive strategy A–ABCD is 36 + 13 δ
1−δ with strategic complements and
20 + 13 δ
1−δ with strategic substitutes and for the strategy A–AAAA these two values are respectively 36
1
1−δ
and 20 1
1−δ .
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Earnings Stage-Game Payoffs Incurred Costs
Matching Number Avg. Avg. Efficiency Avg. 1-Shot Machine
Treatment Groups Subjects (EUR) (ECU) (%) (ECU) (%) (%)
Substitutes
Strong 1–6 48 14.63 34.8 17.6 0.3 9.6
Unilateral 1–6 48 15.05 34.6 16.5 0.2 6.5 3.7
Bilateral 1–6 48 14.76 34.7 16.9 0.3 10.5 0.2
Hot 1,3,4,5 32 15.27 34.7 16.9
Complements
Strong 1–6 48 15.03 34.1 10.9 0.2 5.1
Unilateral 1–6 48 12.61 35.3 23.2 0.2 5.1 3.0
Bilateral 1–6 48 13.11 34.0 10.1 0.2 6.8 0.4
Hot 1,3,4,5 32 14.44 35.6 26.2
Notes: efficiency = 100×
(
Sum of player’s stage game payoffs− 2×piNash
2×piJPM − 2×piNash
)
.
Table 3: Summary of treatments. Stage game average payoffs and efficiency measures are
across all matches and all stages.
be biggest when players are strongly committed.
Conjecture B-2 (Fear of miscoordination) There should be weakly less collusion with
strategic complements than with strategic substitutes when players are strongly committed.
Finally, on the basis of previous experimental work by Potters and Suetens (2009), we could
justify a conjecture that more collusion is to be expected with strategic complements than
with strategic substitutes when players are not committed at all.
4 Results
Table 3 provides a summary of the eight treatments. In general participants had difficulty
establishing more cooperative behavior, with stage game payoffs closer to the one-shot Nash
payoff (33 ECU) than to the joint profit maximizing payoff (43 ECU). The treatments with
strategic complements provided both the least and the most cooperative behavior, with low
levels of cooperation in the strong and bilateral treatments and high levels in the unilateral
and hot treatments. In all treatments, participants incurred very low costs for deviating from
or modifying their machines. One-shot deviations are observed in less than 11% of stage
games. In the unilateral treatments, machine modifications were minimal (after less than 4%
of stage games), while in the bilateral treatment, in which mutual agreement was required,
such changes were rare (after less than 1% of stage games).
The majority of the subsequent analysis uses data from the last third of a session (matches
7–10). This sub-sample provides a reasonable trade-off between using the final matches, where
subject behavior is most likely to have converged, and ensuring enough observations. Analysis
explicitly on the evolution of behavior across matches, as well as some analysis that focuses
13
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Figure 1: Average stage-game action choices.
on very particular histories for which there is the need to expand the sample size, uses data
from the last two-thirds of a session (matches 4–10).
The results are presented in three subsections dealing with the impact of strategic com-
mitment on cooperation, the difference between strategic complements and substitutes and
the strategies participants use. All reported regressions and statistical tests use cluster-robust
standard errors, corrected for arbitrary correlation at the matching-group level.
4.1 Impact of strategic commitment on cooperation
Figure 1 provides an overview of the impact of strategic commitment on action choices in the
stage games. The left-hand panel shows that, with strategic substitutes, commitment has a
minimal impact on choices, with the exception of a small increase in the rate of D choices
(Dev.SS) in the bilateral commitment variation. The situation is markedly different with
strategic complements, as is shown in the right-hand panel. Here, the strong and bilateral
commitment variations display much higher rates of Nash choices compared to the unilateral
variation. Collusion mirrors this pattern, with the former treatments being associated with
less collusion, while the latter is associated with more. For B and D choices (Dev.SC and
Dev.SS) there is little variation across the levels of commitment.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of collusion over time. The top panel shows this time trend
across matches. With strategic substitutes (left panel), collusion is increasing over matches for
the strong and unilateral commitment variations, while no clear trend is seen when bilateral
consent is needed to modify machines. An obvious ranking of commitment levels, on the
extent to which it generates collusion, cannot be made on the basis of this graph. With
strategic complements (right panel), the graph illustrates a clear separation of commitment
14
Substitutes Complements
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Unilateral −0.07 (0.873) 0.24 (0.670) 1.05∗∗ (0.037) −0.28 (0.670)
Bilateral −0.05 (0.879) 0.99∗∗ (0.038) −0.76 (0.241) −1.91 (0.109)
Stage −0.09∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.08∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.15∗ (0.087) −0.15∗ (0.098)
Unilateral x Stage 0.02 (0.648) 0.01 (0.718) 0.05 (0.557) 0.07 (0.470)
Bilateral x Stage −0.03 (0.233) −0.04∗ (0.070) 0.16 (0.115) 0.17 (0.109)
Match 0.35∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.10 (0.361)
Unilateral x Match −0.12 (0.435) 0.52∗∗∗ (0.000)
Bilateral x Match −0.40∗∗ (0.021) 0.44∗ (0.093)
Constant −0.60∗∗∗ (0.002) −1.45∗∗∗ (0.000) −2.25∗∗∗ (0.000) −1.92∗∗∗ (0.003)
Included Matches 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10
Included Stages 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12
M–S Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster VCE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4: Logit regression of the probability of choosing the collusive action. The baseline case
is the strong commitment treatment. ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5% ,∗10% significance.
levels. Collusion rates are highest under unilateral. With strong and bilateral commitment,
collusion rates are lower. There is a trend for collusion rates to increase over time in the
unilateral treatment. However, no such trend is evident for the other commitment types.13
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows how the rates of collusion change within a match. It
displays the typical pattern of collusion decreasing sharply after the first few periods, then
remaining approximately constant at a lower level.
A logistic regression of the probability of choosing the collusion action is used to for-
mally quantify the effect of strategic commitment. Table 4 reports the results of this analysis
separately for strategic complements and substitutes. In the first column, a complete set
of commitment-type dummies is interacted with the stage number of the match.14 This re-
gression confirms the overall message of Figure 1, namely that strategic commitment has no
impact on rates of collusion under strategic substitutes, but has a significant impact under
strategic complements. With strategic complements, the unilateral variation is associated
with significantly higher rates of collusion, while the strong and bilateral variation have sta-
tistically similar rates.
The second column, expands the specification to include the match number as a dependent
variable. Doing so reveals the effects of strategic commitment to work primarily through
13These patterns are most easily seen in Figure 9 of Appendix D, which graphs the predicted rates of
collusion.
14Only data from stages twelve or earlier is used. This restriction is used since later stages did not exist
in each match for each matching group (see Table 2). The regression includes matching-group dummies
that control for possible fixed effects resulting from the particular combination of stages and matches drawn.
See Appendix D for a series of robustness checks for these regressions, including checks for the inclusion of
matching-group dummies (Table 13), the data sub-sample used (Table 14) and the parametric form of the
model (Table 15).
15
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
4 6 8 10 4 6 8 10
Substitutes Complements
Strong Unilateral Bilateral
Pe
rc
en
t C
ol
lu
sio
n 
Ch
oi
ce
 in
 F
irs
t S
ta
ge
Match
Data from matches 4−10 and stages 1−12.
(a) Collusion choice across matches.
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(b) Collusion choice within matches.
Figure 2: The effect of strategic commitment on collusion with strategic substitutes and
complements: percentage of collusion.
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Substitutes Complements
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Unilateral −0.06 (0.444) −0.02 (0.817) 0.19∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.04 (0.436)
Bilateral −0.05 (0.573) 0.00 (0.988) −0.04 (0.428) −0.13 (0.116)
Stage −0.02∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.02∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.01∗∗ (0.037) −0.01∗∗ (0.043)
Unilateral x Stage 0.01 (0.147) 0.01 (0.180) −0.01 (0.265) −0.01 (0.407)
Bilateral x Stage 0.00 (0.955) −0.00 (0.965) 0.01 (0.341) 0.01 (0.266)
Match 0.05∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.01 (0.509)
Unilateral x Match −0.01 (0.672) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.004)
Bilateral x Match −0.02 (0.257) 0.03 (0.136)
Constant 0.38∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.007)
Included Matches 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10
Included Stages 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12
M–S Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster VCE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5: Linear random-effects regression of payoff efficiency in the stage game. The baseline
case is the strong commitment treatment. ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5% ,∗10% significance.
dynamics across matches, as opposed to dynamics within matches or even simple shifts.
These regressions show significant effects for the bilateral variation in the treatments with
strategic complements and substitutes, although via different channels.15
A second measure of the cooperative nature of subjects’ behavior is the implied efficiency
of their choices: the actual surplus generated over and above the one-shot Nash equilibrium
as a percentage of the maximum available surplus. Contrary to focussing on the probability
of choosing the collusive action, this measure aggregates the impact of all choices, including
partial collusion and deviation choices. Figure 3 shows the evolution of efficiency both across
matches (top panel) and within matches (bottom panel). Table 5 provides an analogous
analysis to Table 4 for efficiency.16 As can be seen, the dynamics of realized efficiency levels,
both across matches and within matches, mimics many of the features of the collusion choice.
In particular, across matches, there is again the clear separation of the strong and bilateral
variation from the unilateral variation with strategic complements, while with strategic sub-
stitutes all commitment types end up with similar rates of efficiency by the start of match
10. Within matches, all treatments show the same pattern of decline of efficiency as a match
continues.
The following result summarizes our findings with respect to the impact of strategic com-
mitment on collusion.
Result 1 (i) With strategic substitutes, there is no effect of strategic commitment on average
collusion. (ii) With strategic complements, strategic commitment has a negative effect on
15Again, these features can be seen clearly in Figure 9 of Appendix D, which visualizes the predicted rates
of collusion.
16Figure 10 in Appendix D illustrates the fitted behavior.
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(a) Efficiency across matches.
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(b) Efficiency within matches.
Figure 3: The effect of strategic commitment on efficiency with strategic complements and
substitutes.
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collusion.
With strategic substitutes, the effect is consistent with Conjecture A-0 that is formulated
on basis of standard game theoretical prediction. The evidence is also consistent with the
renegotiation literature, though, since collusion can be sustained in a weak renegotiation proof
equilibrium.
With strategic complements, a different picture emerges. Here, strategic commitment does
have an effect on observed levels of collusion and the direction of this effect is in the opposite
direction to that predicted by renegotiation theory. Strategic commitment is detrimental to
collusion under strategic complements. This effect is consistent with Conjecture A-2 that is
based on the notion of fear of miscoordination.
4.2 Difference between complements and substitutes
While the previous subsection concentrated on the effect of manipulating the level of strategic
commitment, it is clear that there is an interaction effect associated with the type of strategic
interaction. With greater strategic commitment – that is, under the strong or bilateral vari-
ation – there is more collusion with strategic substitutes than with strategic complements.
However, without this strategic commitment – that is, under the unilateral variation – there
is more collusion with strategic substitutes.17
This strategic interaction effect is quantified using analogous regression specifications to
those reported in Table 4, except the data from both game types are pooled and additional
dependent variables are added – a strategic complements indicator interacted with the level
of commitment and stage and the level of commitment and match. Table 6 reports the results
of this exercise for the variables with an interaction with the strategic complements indicator
variable. These results confirm the overall message, with respect to the comparison across
game types, given in Figure 2. Namely, there is a significant effect of the type of strategic
interaction on the development of collusion across matches. Except for the bilateral variation,
which is significantly different, the development of collusion within a match is comparable
across game types.
Result 2 There is more collusion with strategic complements when the level of strategic com-
mitment is low and more collusion with strategic substitutes when the level of commitment is
high.
This results is inconsistent with Conjectures B-0 and B-1 as the type of strategic interaction
does affect the level of collusion we observe (for all levels of commitment). Result 2 is con-
sistent with Conjecture B-2, for high level of commitment, and with previous experimental
17Figure 1 indicates some more direct strategic interaction effects with respect to action choices other than
collusion (A) or Nash (C). In particular, Dev.SS (C) is more frequent under strategic substitutes than under
strategic complements, while the opposite is (marginally) true for Dev.SC (B). However, these are to be
expected given that the (one-shot) best response to the collusion action is Dev.SS in the strategic substitutes
game and Dev.SC in the strategic complements game.
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Combined regression
(1) (2)
Complements −0.66 (0.186) 0.49 (0.508)
Complements x Unilateral 1.08∗ (0.087) −0.52 (0.568)
Complements x Bilateral −0.70 (0.320) −2.86∗∗ (0.024)
Complements x Stage −0.06 (0.484) −0.08 (0.405)
Complements x Unilateral x Stage 0.04 (0.681) 0.06 (0.563)
Complements x Bilateral x Stage 0.18∗ (0.064) 0.21∗∗ (0.047)
Complements x Match −0.45∗∗∗ (0.008)
Complements x Unilateral x Match 0.62∗∗∗ (0.007)
Complements x Bilateral x Match 0.83∗∗∗ (0.004)
Included Matches 7–10 7-10
Included Stages 1–12 1–12
Stage Var. Yes Yes
Match Var. No Yes
M–S Dummies Yes Yes
Cluster VCE Yes Yes
Table 6: Logit regression of the probability of choosing the collusive action – strategic com-
plements versus substitutes. The baseline case is the strong commitment treatment with
strategic substitutes. ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5% ,∗10% significance.
findings by Potters and Suetens (2009), for low levels of commitment. However, this results
adds important new insights to theirs: the differential impact of the type of strategic interac-
tion on collusion strongly depends on the level of commitment. When there is a low level of
commitment, more collusion is observed with strategic substitutes than with complements,
whereas the situation reverses when there is a high level of commitment.
4.3 Individual behavior
The previous subsections dealt with the impact of strategic commitment and type of strategic
interaction by assessing outcomes along the realized path of play. To understand further what
drives these realized paths, this subsection analyses individuals’ intended strategies and their
deviations from these strategies.
4.3.1 Initial choices
Figure 4 shows the average initial choices of the participants in the matches 7 through 10.
Compared to the average action choice across all stages (see Figure 1), the rate of collusion
choice is higher and that of Nash choices lower, for all commitment variations except bilateral.
This difference in collusion choice does not come as a surprise, given the, generally, positive
match effect and the negative stage effect in the regressions of Table 4.
With strategic substitutes the figure does not show any impact of commitment level on
initial choices. In contrast, with strategic complements, strategic commitment matters. Com-
pared to the unilateral variation, there is a higher rate of Nash choices and a lower rate of
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Figure 4: Average initial choices.
collusive choices for the strong and bilateral variation. For the other actions – Dev.SC and
Dev.SS – there is no notable difference between commitment variations.
In sum, all key treatment differences and similarities that were found for average action
choices across all stages are already present in the initial choices. This raises the question
whether the differences and similarities in choices across all stages are completely induced by
the initial choices. Appendix C presents results of simulations that aim to control for path
dependencies. In these simulations, for each treatment, transition matrices are derived from
the intended (machine) and actual choices. To control for the impact initial choices may
have on the realized path, the paths of the resulting processes are studied starting from equal
initial states. The outcomes provide evidence that the treatment differences and similarities
in choices across all stages are not purely induced by initial choices.
4.3.2 Dynamic responses (machines)
Table 7 gives the distribution of machines that participants programmed at the beginning of
matches 7–10. The seven types of machines that are reported in the table are the only ones
that were used with a frequency of at least 5 percent in at least one of the treatments. All the
reported machines seem reasonable, with the majority corresponding to strategies that are
commonly seen either in prior experimental studies or from the theory of repeated games. The
first four (AAAA, ABC(C/D), ACCC and BBCC) attempt to establish some collusion – either
unconditionally or conditionally – and are used 26–35 percent of the time in all treatments.
The non-cooperative Nash machine (CCCC) is used 10–26 percent of the time. The myopic
best response is used 12–25 percent of the time (with substitutes this is the DCCC-machine;
with complements the BCCC-machine). As expected, the DCCC-machine was rarely used
21
Substitutes Complements
Machine Strong Unilateral Bilateral Strong Unilateral Bilateral
Uncond. coop. AAAA 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01
Cond. coop. ABC(C/D) 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.23 0.18
Nash reversion ACCC 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.05
Part. coll + Nash rev. BBCC 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.07
Nash CCCC 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.26
Myopic best reponse DCCC 0.16 0.19 0.12
BCCC 0.25 0.15 0.21
Punishing DDDD 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other ——– 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.20 0.27 0.22
Table 7: Machine categorization: Distribution of machines in initial stages of matches 7–10
across treatments. Machines that are used with frequency below 5 percent in every treatment
are categorized as “Other”.
with complements; possibly less expected, though, is the rare use of the BCCC-machine with
substitutes. The punishing machine (DDDD) was used once at a frequency above 5 percent,
and this was in a treatment where machine modifications were the easiest to implement.18
Result 3 Irrespective of the type of strategic interaction and the level of strategic commit-
ment, the four most prominent machines are tit-for-tat (ABCD), Nash reversion (ACCC),
Nash (CCCC) and myopic best response (DCCC or BCCC). All other machines are used less
than 10 percent of the time in every treatment.
Table 7 suggests that, with a high level of strategic commitment (i.e. in the strong or bi-
lateral variations), the difference in the type of machine used, when comparing strategic
substitutes to complements, is mainly in the use of the myopic best response machine. With
strategic substitutes, the myopic best response (DCCC) is used 16/12 percent of the time
(strong/bilateral), whereas the comparable machine (BCCC) is used in 25/21 percent of the
time (strong/bilateral) with strategic complements. Cooperative machines account for 33–
35 percent and 31–33 percent of the machines with strategic substitutes and complements,
respectively.
For low levels of strategic commitment (unilateral), the situation changes. Here, the
use of the myopic best response is not so different across the two interaction types – 19
percent with strategic substitutes and 15 percent with complements. The most prominent
difference is instead the use of cooperative machines. With strategic complements 45 percent
of machines are cooperative, while only in 26 percent of instances do participants start out
with a cooperative machine in strategic substitutes. Consequently, strategic complementarity
1818–34 percent of the machines are categorized as “Other”. This group comprises machines that all are
used less than 5 percent of the time in every treatment. Table 16 in Appendix D decomposes this category
further, and shows that these seven prominent machines give a fair characterization in the sense that many
machines categorized as “Other” are minor deviations from these prominent seven.
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Substitutes Complements
Matches Strong Unilateral Bilateral Strong Unilateral Bilateral
1–3 0.114 0.082 0.103 0.047 0.077 0.049
4–6 0.075 0.077 0.115 0.043 0.054 0.084
7–10 0.100 0.051 0.099 0.058 0.037 0.067
Table 8: Frequency of one-shot deviations in the different treatments in different match-
clusters.
appears to induce more collusive behavior when opponents are not strongly committed to
their initial intended strategies.
In addition, keeping the type of strategic interaction constant, there are strong differences
in the machines used for the various commitment levels. With strategic substitutes, initial
machines in the bilateral variation are programmed to punish the use of the deviation action
more harshly than for the strong (p = 0.0053) or unilateral (p = 0.0128) variations. With
strategic complements, there are even more differences. Machines respond more collusively to
actions A (p < 0.0001) and B (p = 0.0005) for the low level of commitment (unilateral) than
for the high level of commitment (strong). The responses to action A are also significantly
different for the bilateral variation compared to the strong (p = 0.0142) and unilateral (p <
0.0001) variations.
Result 4 Participants tend to hold more cooperative machines with strategic substitutes if
the level of strategic commitment is high. With strategic complements they tend to hold more
cooperative machines if the level of strategic commitment is low.
We complete the machine analysis by investigating when and how participants implement
one-shot deviations and machine modifications.
One-shot deviations Table 8 shows the frequency of one-shot deviations across the dif-
ferent treatments. It can be seen that one-shot deviations are rarely used (on average, less
than 10 percent of all instances). In the final matches, one-shot deviations are less frequent
in the unilateral variation, and throughout all matches less frequent with strategic comple-
ments than with strategic substitutes for all commitment levels. However, these treatment
differences are by and large not significant.19
We also ask whether the frequency of one-shot deviations depends on the machine that the
individual holds at the time of the one-shot deviation. The machine AAAA (unconditional
19Established using logit regressions on the probability of a one-shot deviation in the first twelve stages
of a match using data from all matches and just matches 7–10. Treatment and stage dummies, plus their
interaction terms, were included as independent variables; standard errors were clustered by matching group.
In addition, a regression was run in which all commitment levels were grouped, and used to test for differences
between strategic substitutes and complements. The only significant effect was for the bilateral variation with
strategic complements, where one-shot deviations were initially less frequent but tended to increase more over
time. Regression tables are available upon request.
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cooperation) triggers one-shot deviations in 45–77 percent of the instances for the strong and
bilateral commitment variations. However, these deviations came from very few participants
and hence should be interpreted with care. All other machines are much less likely to in-
volve one-shot deviations, with frequencies below 10 percent in all treatments. Table 17 in
Appendix D summarizes these results.
One-shot deviations from the unconditional cooperative machine (AAAA) are used exclu-
sively to play Nash or to punish, where the punishment action coincides with the myopic best
response in the case of strategic substitutes. Deviations from the Nash machines (CCCC)
are mostly used to establish full or partial collusion. See Table 18 in Appendix D for further
details.
Unilateral modifications Figure 5 illustrates the effect of unilateral machine modifica-
tions on average machines. Two points should be noted. First, average machines are “steeper”
and more cooperative – that is, respond more often with a collusive action if the opponent has
chosen the collusive action in the previous stage – with strategic complements. Indeed, the
difference in average machines is there in all commitment variations and highly significant
according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney test (strong: p = 0.0006; unilateral: p < 0.0001;
bilateral: p = 0.0001).20
Second, unilateral deviations tend to make machines more cooperative with strategic sub-
stitutes and less cooperative with strategic complements. This effect is significant (according
to a two-sided Mann-Whitney test) for responses to actions A and B with strategic substitutes
in matches 4–10 (p = 0.0132 and p = 0.0426 respectively). With strategic complements the
effect is significant for responses to action A in matches 7–10 (p < 0.0001) and to actions B,
C and D in matches 4–10 (p = 0.0126, p = 0.0951 and p = 0.0982 respectively).21
Bilateral modifications During matches 7–10 there were only 6 bilateral deviations with
strategic substitutes and 9 with strategic complements from respectively 5 and 7 machines.
Given this small number of observations, it is not possible to produce sensible graphs equiv-
alent to those in Figure 5. Despite these low numbers of actual modifications, many more
attempts to modify are undertaken: 92 with strategic substitutes and 128 with strategic
complements.22
20These tests are based on 192 observations per treatment and hence are likely to underestimate standard
deviations somewhat, since each participant appears four times in the sample (once for each match 7–10).
21Table 19 of Appendix D reports participants’ propensity to modify their machine conditional on holding
a particular machine.
22Table 20 of Appendix D reports participants’ eagerness to modify their machine conditional on holding a
particular machine.
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Figure 5: The effect of unilateral deviations on average machines. Stars indicate significance
levels according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5% ,∗10% significance.
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5 Discussion
For the purposes of providing a benchmark, our results show similarities and differences
with prior experimental studies on cooperation in repeated games. Comparing our results
to studies using indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma stage games, we find, as elsewhere,
that cooperation being part of a subgame Nash equilibrium is not a sufficient condition to
observe high rates of cooperation. Indeed, compared to the prisoners’ dilemma game, our
four action games of strategic complements and substitutes display relatively low overall rates
of cooperation. For example, cooperation is much more prevalent in the most comparable
treatment from Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011a), where observed rates of the order of 60%
averaged over all rounds in all matches.23 However, the dynamic responses that we observed
do correspond to strategies that are commonly seen in other experiments; in particular, tit-
for-tat, always Nash and Nash reversion.
Our results show that, while strategic commitment has no effect on collusion under strate-
gic substitutes, it has a significantly negative effect under strategic complements. The effect
is such that there is more collusion under strategic complements when commitment is low (as
is also found in Potters and Suetens, 2009), whereas there is more collusion under strategic
substitutes when commitment is high. There are two commonly used equilibrium selection
concepts that give some role for strategic commitment, namely renegotiation-proofness and
risk-dominance. We consider each notion in turn and find that neither concept can provide
an explanation for our observed treatment effects. We suggest an alternative that is based on
fear of miscoordination, which can capture all our treatment effects.
5.1 Renegotiation
The observed ranking of collusion rates across treatments goes against the intuition delivered
by the renegotiation literature. In particular, with higher levels of strategic commitment,
and hence reduced concerns for renegotiation, we observe less collusion under strategic com-
plements. Although renegotiation should never happen in equilibrium – whether collusion is
weak renegotiation proof or not – it is reasonable to expect the strategic forces that drive
the concept would need to be learnt by experience. Consequently, there is still the possibility
that subjects engaged in something like renegotiation, but that such efforts did not feed back
into reduced collusion at the beginning of a match.
As shown in the results, bilateral modifications take place very rarely. Consequently, there
are few instances where participants succeeded in coordinating on a mutual modification of
their machines. Still, the data collected on strategic decisions throughout the experiment
23The most comparable treatment of theirs has a cooperation payoff of 40 and a discount factor of 3/4.
Compared to our games, their (normalized) temptation (and sucker) payoffs are a little lower, which would
suggest lower cooperation rates in our implementation. However, our discount rate of 7/8 is larger, which
would suggest to find higher rates of cooperation in our set-up. In both cases, cooperation is risk dominant,
as defined in their paper.
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allows some analysis regarding which paths are “renegotiated”, and if so, how. Thereto,
we study when and how machines are (attempted to be) modified conditional on the last
outcome of the realized path of play. We classify paths into three categories: (i) “failed
collusion” (outcomes (B,A) and (A,B)), (ii) “miscoordination” (from the perspective of a
cooperative agent; outcomes (A,C), (A,D), (B,C) and (B,D)) and (iii) “punishment paths”
(outcomes (C,D), (D,C) and (D,D)). After a “miscoordination” stage, participants mostly try
to modify cooperative machines into more punishing machines. Along “punishment paths”,
participants mostly (want to) modify non-cooperative machines, but rarely modify them into
more collusive machines.24 Hence, there is no strong evidence that participants engaged in
something like renegotiation.
5.2 Risk-dominance
Given the large number of possible equilibria in these indefinitely repeated games, it seems
intuitive that considerations of renegotiation might be overshadowed by concerns of coordi-
nation on one of the different equilibria. Hence, it seems intuitive to look at risk-dominance,
since it gives some role for a fear of equilibrium miscoordination. As discussed in Dal Bo´ and
Fre´chette (2011a), extending the idea of risk-dominance to infinitely repeated games posses
a number of difficulties, even with only two actions for each player. These difficulties include
extending the definition to repeated-game strategies and the issue that two repeated-game
strategies can generate equivalent outcome paths. To these difficulties, our environment also
adds the issue of extending the definition to more action choices in the stage game.
Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011) consider an extension of the concept to the re-
peated prisoners’ dilemma that involves only the strategies permanent Nash reversion and
always Nash. Translating this approach to our environment results in the prediction that
Nash reversion, with an initial choice of cooperation, is the risk-dominant strategy for both
types of strategic interaction and all levels of strategic commitment.25 In what follows, we
discuss how a definition of fear of miscoordination, which does not restrict itself to equilibrium
miscoordination, can accommodate the observed behavior.
24See Table 21 in Appendix D for details.
25When focussing only on the Nash reversion and always Nash strategies, there is only one difference between
the strategic complement and strategic substitute games: the (A,C) payoff in the complements game is lower
than that in the substitutes game (14 rather than 25). With a discount rate of 7/8 and the uniform prior
as the belief of the opponent’s strategy, this difference is too small to result in different predictions for the
risk-dominance concept. One could consider allowing for a non-uniform prior. However, only a relatively small
range of beliefs would result in the always Nash machine being selected in the complements game, whereas the
Nash reversion machine is selected in the substitutes game. The weight on the opponent choosing the always
Nash machine would need to be at least 77% and no more than 88%. There is no support in the data for such
a range of beliefs; see, for example, Table 7.
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5.3 Fear of miscoordination
We have seen in Sections 3 and 4 that a notion of fear of miscoordination based on minmax
regret is consistent with our treatment rankings both in terms of strategic commitment (Con-
jecture A-2) and type of strategic interaction (Conjecture B-2). In what follows, we consider
whether there is any evidence in subject behavior for the mechanics of such fear of misco-
ordination. In terms of strategic commitment, participants do indeed use more cooperative
machines in the unilateral variation for strategic complements (52%) compared to the strong
commitment variation (33%, two-sided ranksum test p < 0.0001; see also Table 22 in the
Appendix). This is exactly as fear of miscoordination predicts (Conjecture A-2). Under sub-
stitutes, however, there is no such effect for strategic commitment. At this point, one could
argue that this is simply a result of fear of miscoordination being weaker under substitutes.
However, there is another crucial difference between substitutes and complements.
In the complements game the optimal deviation to the collusive action is “close” to the
collusive action in the action space – such as a small price undercut in the Bertrand model –
while in the substitutes game the optimal deviation to the collusive action is “further away”
from the collusive action in the action space – such as a supply beyond competitive levels in
the Cournot model.26 In the experiment, around 90% of machines in the substitutes game
respond to action D (Dev.SS) with either action C or D, while in the complements game only
about 60–80% respond to action B (Dev.SC) with action C or D (see Table 22 in Appendix D).
Hence, the presence of defectors easily locks a population into paths involving only defection
(actions C or D) in the substitutes game, whereas in the complements game a population
may still remain in (partially) collusive outcomes (actions A or B). Thus, all else equal, one
should expect less collusion in the substitutes game. Of course, the “all else equal” condition
may not be satisfied, since participants may anticipate this and choose different strategies
from the outset. In particular, if they understand these dynamics, it is reasonable to expect
participants to refrain from choosing defective actions in the substitutes game, especially
when there is strong strategic commitment.
Strong strategic commitment When participants are strongly committed to their strat-
egy choices, they adopt the myopic best response strategy less often with strategic substitutes
than with complements: only 16% of the machines have this characteristic in the former ver-
sus 25% in the latter (see Table 7). This difference is statistically significant (p = 0.0321;
two-sided ranksum test on the myopic best response dummy with first stage machines in
matches 7–10 as the unit of independent observation). This difference is intuitive since, as
argued above, it is easier to get stuck in a punishment cycle in the substitutes game when
using such a machine. In the final three matches, we find that matches in which one of the
participants used the myopic best response were stuck playing action D about 15% of the
26These differences are not detectable in 2×2 games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, and are a notable
feature of our design.
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time with strategic substitutes and less than 1% of the time with complements. In fact, in
the substitutes game, participants seem to have learned to avoid the dangerous myopic best
response machine: it was more than twice as popular in the first three matches than in the
final four matches (34% percent of the time in the first three matches). In the complements
game, as opposed to the substitutes game, intentions can be masked while playing myopic
best response, since the optimal deviation action coincides with partial collusion. Indeed, we
do not see the previous trend in the use of myopic best responses in these treatments (23%
percent of the time in the first three matches).
While the myopic best response machine is more common with strategic complements if
there is strong commitment, participants choose conditionally-cooperative machines some-
what more often with substitutes (40% vs. 33%; see Table 22). This is consistent with fear
of miscoordination since, as we have seen in Subsection 3.3, the payoff consequences of mis-
coordinating with a cooperative machine tend to be more severe with strategic complements
than with strategic substitutes (in terms of minmax regret).
Weak strategic commitment Under weak strategic commitment, masking intentions in
the complements game is less effective than under strong strategic commitment. If partici-
pants truly miscoordinate on the collusive outcomes, with one player choosing action A while
the other chooses action B, then it is reasonable to expect the latter to implement a unilateral
change towards full collusion. If this were not to happen, the intentions of the latter are no
longer masked, and it becomes evident that they were myopically best responding rather than
trying to cautiously implement collusion. Indeed, the myopic best response machine is used
less under weak commitment (15%) than under strong commitment (25%). This difference
is statistically significant (p = 0.0156; two-sided ranksum test on “myopic best response”
dummy with first stage machines in matches 7–10 as the unit of independent observation).
Now, in terms of the usage of the myopic best response machine, there is no longer a big dif-
ference between substitutes and complements: it is used 15% of the time in the complements
game versus 19% of the time in the substitutes game.
Instead, under weak commitment, machines are more cooperative with complements than
with substitutes. About 52% of the machines attempt to establish collusion (reply to action
A with action A) in the complements game as opposed to only 35% in the substitutes game
(see Table 22 in Appendix D). This difference is statistically significant (p = 0.0010; two-
sided ranksum test on dummy that indicates whether the machine is programmed to respond
to action A with action A and with first stage machines in matches 7–10 as the unit of
independent observation). The 52% of cooperative machines in the complements game with
weak commitment also represent a significant increase compared to the earlier case with strong
commitment (p = 0.0003; same test). It appears that myopic best responders, who could
conceal their intentions under strong commitment, seem to be switching to more cooperative
machines when such masking of intentions is no longer possible. As a consequence, there is
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more cooperation with complements than with substitutes under weak commitment.
6 Conclusion
We have studied the effect of strategic commitment on collusion in infinitely repeated games
and found that, while strategic commitment does not affect collusion with strategic substi-
tutes, it has a negative effect with strategic complements. The latter effect is strong enough
that, although there is more collusion with substitutes if the level of strategic commitment is
high, there is more collusion with complements when the level of commitment is low.
We observe a great deal of heterogeneity in the strategies that participants use, but most
participants use either one of the four following machines: Nash, myopic best response, tit-
for-tat or Nash reversion. The ratios with which these strategies are chosen differ across
treatments. With strategic substitutes, participants learn to avoid the myopic best response
strategy, in particular when they are strongly committed. In contrast, with strategic com-
plements, participants avoid this machine only when they are weakly committed; with strong
commitment, it is the most adopted strategy. We conjecture that, when participants are
strongly committed, they can credibly mask their ‘possibly hostile’ intentions under strategic
complements, where the optimal deviation action coincides with partial collusion. Starting
with partial collusion can be justified for participants that in principle want to coordinate on
full collusion, but are afraid of the consequences of miscoordinating when choosing the fully
collusive outcome.
These results should be of interest to anyone interested in strategy elicitation in infinitely
repeated games, anyone studying renegotiation or strategic commitment, and anyone inter-
ested in the factors (strategic interaction type, strategic commitment) that determine collusive
behavior. Our results are also suggestive for the design of optimal antitrust regulation such as
controlling the boundaries on strategic oversight within corporations. From the business per-
spective, our results indicate that the optimal level of strategic oversight within corporations
depends on the underlying nature of their strategic interaction with rivals.
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A Instructions (Strong commitment – strategic complements)
Part 1
Welcome!
You are about to participate in a session on interactive decision-making. Thank you for
agreeing to take part. The session should last 90 to 120 minutes.
You should have already turned off all mobile phones, smart phones, mp3 players and all such
devices by now. If not, please do so immediately. These devices must remain switched off
throughout the session. Place them in your bag or on the floor besides you. Do not have
them in your pocket or on the table in front of you.
The entire session, including all interaction between you and other participants, will take
place through the computer. You are not allowed to talk or to communicate with other par-
ticipants in any other way during the session.
You are asked to abide by these rules throughout the session. Should you fail to do so, we
will have to exclude you from this (and future) session(s) and you will not receive any com-
pensation for this session.
We will start with a brief instruction period. Please read these instructions carefully. They
are identical for all participants in this session with whom you will interact. If you have any
questions about these instructions or at any other time during the experiment, then please
raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to answer your question.
Compensation for participation in this session
In addition to the 3 participation fee, what you will earn from this session will depend on
your decisions, the decisions of others and chance. In the instructions and all decision tasks
that follow, payoffs are reported in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the end of the
experiment, the total amount you have earned will be converted into Euros using the following
conversion rate:
1 ECU = 4 Eurocents.
The payment takes place in cash at the end of the experiment. Your decisions in the experi-
ment will remain anonymous.
General instructions
The session is structured as follows:
1. This session consists of 10 matches. At the beginning of each match, you will be ran-
domly paired with another participant.
2. During the match, you will interact repeatedly with this same participant for a number
of rounds.
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3. The number of rounds is randomly determined. After each round, there is an 87.5%
chance that the match will continue for at least another round. This is as if we were to
roll an 8-sided die and end if the number 1 came up and continue if 2 through 8 came
up. Notice that, if you are in round 2, the probability that there will be a third round
is 87.5% and if you are in round 9, the probability that there will be a tenth round is
also 87.5%. That is, at any point in the match, the probability that there will be at
least one more round is 87.5%. This means that, in expectation, another 8 rounds will
follow, irrespective of the number of rounds you have just completed.
4. Once a match ends, you will be matched with a randomly drawn participant for the
next match.
Description of a match
5. During a match you will repeatedly interact with the same participant for a number of
rounds. Each round consists of the same decision situation.
6. In this decision situation, you will be asked to choose an action. There are four possible
actions: A, B, C or D. The participant you are matched with will also be asked to
choose an action. The set of possible actions to choose from is the same for both of you.
7. Your payoff for the round depends on your action and the action of the participant you
are matched with. For each possible combination of actions, the table below displays the
payoffs for you and the other participant. The rows, which correspond to your action,
are labeled in capital letters; the columns, which correspond to the other’s action, are
labeled in lower-case letters. In each cell your payoff is first (in the darker font) and the
other participant’s payoff is second (in the lighter font). For example, if your action is B
and the other participant’s action is c, your payoff is 32 ECU and the other participant’s
payoff is 40 ECU.
Other’s action
a b c d
A 43, 43 23, 54 14, 52 7, 47
Your B 54, 23 36, 36 32, 40 28, 37
action C 52, 14 40, 32 33, 33 31, 32
D 47, 7 37, 28 32, 31 30, 30
8. To summarize, in a match you interact repeatedly with the same participant for
an unknown number of rounds in the decision situation described above. As described
in point 3 above, after every round, there is a 87.5% chance of another round in this
match.
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Your decisions (How actions are chosen)
At the beginning of a match
9. At the very beginning of every match, you will be asked to specify your initial action
and to provide a plan of intended actions. The initial action is the action you choose
in the first round of this match. The plan of intended actions determines for each
subsequent round which action you intend to choose in response to each possible action
choice of the other participant in the previous round.
10. The table below presents an example of a plan of intended actions, as it will be visualized
on your screen. In this example, the plan prescribes you to take action D in all rounds
immediately following one in which the other participant has taken action a (action
D is checked in column a). In periods immediately following one in which the other
participant has chosen action b, the plan prescribes you to take action B (action B is
checked in column b) and so forth.
Your plan
(example) a b c d
A ◦ A ◦ A ◦ A ◦
B ◦ B • B ◦ B ◦
C ◦ C ◦ C ◦ C •
D • D ◦ D • D ◦
Notice that the table above is just one example of a plan. In the experiment you will
be asked to design your own plan.
11. Since it will be costly (see point 15 below) to choose an action different from the one
prescribed by your intended plan of action, you are advised to think carefully about
how to design your plan.
12. Once you and the participant you are matched with have made your choice of initial
action and plan of intended actions, the first round of the sequence of decision situations
described above will begin.
During round 1
13. In the first round, your action choice will be the initial action you just chose.
During later rounds
14. At the beginning of any subsequent round you will be told the prescribed action from
your plan of intended actions.
15. You will then be asked to choose your action for the current round. It is possible to
choose an action different from the one prescribed by your plan of intended actions.
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However, doing so will cost 3 ECU. Note also that you will need to select this action
and click on the “OK” button within the time limit shown on your screen; otherwise
your prescribed action will be chosen.
At the end of each round
16. At the end of each round you will receive feedback on your action chosen, the action
chosen by the other participant and your payoffs as well as about any costs incurred for
deviating from the plan of intended actions.
The end of the session
17. After a match is finished, you will be randomly paired for a new match. This session
consists of 10 such matches.
18. In each of the 10 matches, your payoff starts at 0 and from there accumulates until the
end of your match. At the end of the session – after the tenth match – one match will
be selected at random. The payoff you gained during the selected match will be used
to calculate your final payoff.
Control Questions
Please read through the following and answer the questions. When you have finished answer-
ing these questions, please raise your hand.
Assume you specified action A as initial action and the following plan of intended actions:
Your plan a b c d
A • A ◦ A • A ◦
B ◦ B • B ◦ B •
C ◦ C ◦ C ◦ C ◦
D ◦ D ◦ D ◦ D ◦
Suppose that the other participant chooses action b in the first round.
1. What is your payoff in the first round?
2. What is the other participant’s payoff in the first round?
3. Which action does your plan prescribe you to choose in the second round?
Assume that you choose the prescribed action in the second round. Suppose that the other
participant chooses action d in the second round.
4. What is your payoff in the second round?
5. Which action will you be prescribed to choose in the third round?
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True or False?
Please answer whether the following statements are true or false:
6. The longer a match has been going on the more likely it is to end.
7. Each round I can choose the action I want.
8. I can modify my plan of intended action after each round within a match.
9. I am matched with the same participant during the entire session.
10. I am matched with the same participant during each match.
Part 2
Control Questions – Answers
1. In the first round, if you choose A and the other participant chooses b, then your payoff
is 23.
2. In the first round, if you choose A and the other participant chooses b, then the other
participant’s payoff is 54.
3. The other participant chose b in the first round. Reading column b of your plan gives
you a prescribed action of B.
4. In the second round, if you choose B and the other participant chooses d, then your
payoff is 28.
5. The other participant chose d in the second round. Reading column d of your plan gives
you a prescribed action of B.
True or False? – Answers
6. False: at any point in the match, the probability that there will be at least one more
round is 87.5%.
7. True: In any round, you can choose the action you would like. In particular, it is
possible to choose an action different from the one prescribed by your plan of intended
actions. However, doing so will cost 3 ECU.
8. False: you can only modify your plan of intended actions at the beginning of a match.
9. False: once a match ends, you will be matched with a randomly drawn participant for
the next match.
10. True: in a match you interact repeatedly with the same participant
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Summary
1. At the beginning of a match, you choose your initial action and your plan of intended
actions.
2. Every round (except for the first round) your plan prescribes an action that depends
on the action of the other participant in the previous round.
3. In any round (except for the first round), you can either choose the prescribed action
or choose another action. Choosing an action which is different from your prescribed
action has a cost of 3 ECU.
4. The length of a match is randomly determined. After each round, there is an 87.5 %
chance that the match will continue for at least one more round. You will play with the
same person for the entire match.
5. After a match is finished, you will be randomly paired for a new match. This session
consists of 10 such matches.
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B The hot treatment
Subsection 4.3 provides a good indicator that participants did not feel restricted in their choice
of strategies as they do use reasonable machines and employ one-shot deviations infrequently.
To get a precise measure of whether imposing the small cost for one-shot deviations and
machine modifications distorts decisions, additional hot treatment were conducted. In these
treatments, the cost of one-shot deviations were set to zero so that any strategy (even the
most erratic ones) can be played at no cost.
Figure 6 compares rates of action choice across the four treatments for both strategic
substitutes and complements. The top panel gives the rates across all stages, the lower panel
for only the initial stage. The rates of action choices in the hot treatments are very similar
to those observed in the unilateral treatments. Furthermore, the observed comparative static
across types of strategic interaction is the same between these two treatments.
Given the evidence above that observed behavior in the hot treatments is comparable to
that in the unilateral treatments, Table 9 and Figure 7 replicate the collusion-choice regres-
sion analysis of Section 4 for the hot treatment, using the unilateral variation as the base
observation. Table 10 and Figure 8 repeat the analysis for the efficiency measure. As can be
most clearly seen in the graphs, behavior in the hot treatment is remarkably similar to that
in the unilateral treatment in all aspects except the across match development in the case of
strategic substitutes. Here, cooperative behavior starts a little bit higher and increases at a
slower rate in the hot treatment compared to the unilateral treatment. However, it should
be emphasized that the across match evolution of cooperative behavior in both treatments
would not be statistically different from that observed in the strong commitment treatment
with strategic substitutes, especially when looking at the efficiency measure.
Substitutes Complements
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Hot −0.51 (0.246) −1.30∗∗ (0.042) 0.70∗ (0.052) 1.08 (0.115)
Stage −0.09∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.08∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.12∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.10∗∗∗ (0.000)
Hot x Stage 0.02 (0.376) 0.02 (0.524) 0.02 (0.661) 0.00 (0.893)
Match 0.11 (0.440) 0.48∗∗∗ (0.000)
Hot x Match 0.30∗∗ (0.019) −0.11 (0.547)
Constant −0.94∗∗∗ (0.000) −1.14∗∗∗ (0.006) −1.40∗∗∗ (0.008) −2.58∗∗∗ (0.000)
Included Matches 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10
Included Stages 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12
M–S Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster VCE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9: Logit regression of the probability of choosing the collusive action.
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Figure 6: Average stage-game choices.
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(b) Collusion choice within matches.
Figure 7: Collusion choice in the unilateral and hot treatments.
41
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
4 6 8 10 4 6 8 10
Substitutes Complements
Unilateral Hot
Av
er
ag
e 
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
in
 F
irs
t S
ta
ge
 (P
erc
en
t) 
Match
Data from matches 4−10 and stages 1−12.
(a) Efficiency across matches.
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Data from matches 7−10 and stages 1−12.
(b) Efficiency within matches.
Figure 8: Efficiency in the unilateral and hot treatments.
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Substitutes Compliments
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Hot −0.06 (0.552) −0.06 (0.643) 0.11 (0.202) 0.10 (0.501)
Stage −0.01∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.02∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.02∗∗∗ (0.004)
Hot x Stage −0.00 (0.994) −0.00 (0.964) −0.00 (0.885) −0.00 (0.826)
Match 0.03 (0.257) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.000)
Hot x Match 0.00 (0.969) 0.01 (0.908)
Constant 0.30∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.23∗∗ (0.020) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.07 (0.471)
Included Matches 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10
Included Stages 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12
M–S Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster VCE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 10: Linear random-effects regression of payoff efficiency in the stage game.
Behavior under the hot treatments is by and large very similar to behavior in the corre-
sponding unilateral treatments. This result lends support to the conclusion that participants
did not feel overly constrained in their strategies by the costs that are imposed by one-shot
deviations.
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C Controlling for path dependency
In order to isolate the impact of the responsive part of the strategies from initial choices,
we compute the invariant distribution over actions of the Markov chain as specified by the
dynamic responses. The invariant distribution tells us with which probabilities the actions
will be chosen in the long run if play continues as it is observed in our experimental sessions,
regardless of the initial choices. We compute these invariant distributions using the transition
probabilities as defined by (1) the average initial machine, (2) the average over chosen actions
in response to rival’s actions, and (3) the average chosen actions in response to outcomes.
Note that by taking averages over the average behavior of an individual in a match (of the
last four matches only), we disregard the heterogeneity that is clearly present in our data
(which is more pronounced between individuals than between matches). Although the job is
in principle better done when properly controlling for heterogeneity in behavior, it is certainly
computationally more involved and (as we believe) not needed for our illustrative purposes.
The invariant distributions obtained for the different treatments using the three different
specifications of the Markov chain are presented in Table 11.
Substitutes Complements
Transitions Action Strong Unilateral Bilateral Strong Unilateral Bilateral
Initial A 0.0372 0.0916 0.0630 0.0086 0.1416 0.0153
Machines B 0.0760 0.0523 0.0709 0.0633 0.1146 0.0701
C 0.7834 0.6889 0.6414 0.8769 0.6531 0.8410
D 0.1034 0.1672 0.2247 0.0511 0.0907 0.0736
Realized A 0.1252 0.1430 0.1210 0.0561 0.0989 0.0528
Actions B 0.0997 0.0543 0.0560 0.1105 0.1062 0.1021
(actions) C 0.6361 0.6235 0.5879 0.7735 0.6691 0.7703
D 0.1390 0.1792 0.2351 0.0599 0.1258 0.0748
Realized A 0.1258 0.1095 0.1076 0.0473 0.0552 0.0471
Actions B 0.0968 0.0585 0.0630 0.0887 0.0948 0.0646
(outcomes) C 0.6580 0.6826 0.6130 0.7881 0.7006 0.7669
D 0.1194 0.1494 0.2163 0.0759 0.1494 0.1215
Table 11: Invariant distribution.
The differences in long-run distributions across treatments are quite in line with those
of the percentages as presented in Figure 1. The logit regressions presented in Table 4 (see
also Figure 2(a)) show that in case of strategic complementarities a higher level of collusion
is obtained when unilateral modifications of the dynamic response is allowed. The invariant
distributions show a consistent picture and that this effect is not only caused by initial choices
(see Figures 4 and 2(b)).
Apart from Complements–Unilateral, the weight on the top two actions (A and B) is
smaller and that on the lower two actions (C and D) is larger using the realized actions, which
indicates that one-shot deviations and machine modifications are mainly used to escape profit
eroding states in favor for collusive ones.
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Table 12 presents the persistence of the collusive outcome, the Nash outcome, the top
two actions and the lower two actions. For the single state outcomes the persistence is the
probability that the state is not left in the next stage given that it is reached. For the sets
of states these probabilities are weighted by the invariant distribution of the Markov process
over outcomes (to properly account for all states within a set not being more likely being
reached). Again, we derive the probabilities in the three alternative ways as before.
Substitutes Complements
Transitions Outcome Strong Unilateral Bilateral Strong Unilateral Bilateral
Initial (A,A) 0.1567 0.1218 0.2296 0.1111 0.2659 0.0913
Machines (C,C) 0.6944 0.5703 0.5393 0.7932 0.6104 0.7565
(AB,AB) 0.1106 0.1258 0.1690 0.0782 0.4036 0.1529
(CD,CD) 0.8369 0.7948 0.8262 0.8914 0.7645 0.8895
Realized (A,A) 0.2004 0.2440 0.1757 0.1494 0.3285 0.1715
Actions (C,C) 0.5339 0.5405 0.5133 0.6934 0.5989 0.6980
(actions) (AB,AB) 0.1619 0.2217 0.1854 0.2014 0.3008 0.2891
(CD,CD) 0.6834 0.7568 0.7701 0.7918 0.7806 0.8377
Realized (A,A) 0.8422 0.7204 0.5814 0.7008 0.8580 0.8789
Actions (C,C) 0.6809 0.7514 0.5993 0.7987 0.7022 0.8010
(outcomes) (AB,AB) 0.7071 0.5950 0.5530 0.4774 0.6647 0.7321
(CD,CD) 0.7924 0.8670 0.8062 0.8763 0.8427 0.9207
Table 12: Direct recurring transitions.
It is apparent that the persistence probabilities of the collusive outcome are substantially
larger when applying the data of how outcomes are translated into actions. This shows us
that one-shot deviations and dynamic response modifications are used to sustain cooperation.
Application of outcome to action data also increases the persistence probabilities of the static
Nash outcome when dynamic responses can be revised, but not when only one-shot deviations
are possible. This indicates that in a setting with less strategic commitment, and hence
better possibilities to renegotiate, punishments are sustained by means of one-shot deviations
and dynamic response modifications. If anything, this provides evidence against the idea of
renegotiation playing an important role. This means that the idea of renegotiation is also not
learned (or should be unlearned) during the sessions and can be expected to be anticipated
and absorbed in initial choices.
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D Additional material
D.1 Figures
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Data from matches 4−10 and stages 1−12.
(a) Collusion choice across matches.
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Data from matches 7−10 and stages 1−12.
(b) Collusion choice within matches.
Figure 9: The effect of strategic commitment on collusion with strategic complements and
substitutes: predicted values from a logit regression.
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Data from matches 4−10 and stages 1−12.
(a) Efficiency across matches.
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Data from matches 7−10 and stages 1−12.
(b) Efficiency within matches.
Figure 10: The effect of strategic commitment on efficiency with strategic complements and
substitutes: predicted values from a linear random-effects regression.
47
D.2 Tables
Substitutes Complements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unilateral −0.07 −0.07 0.24 0.24 1.05∗∗ 1.00∗ −0.28 −0.27
(0.873) (0.866) (0.670) (0.636) (0.037) (0.061) (0.670) (0.750)
Bilateral −0.05 −0.04 0.99∗∗ 0.98∗ −0.76 −0.74 −1.91 −1.82
(0.879) (0.909) (0.038) (0.067) (0.241) (0.252) (0.109) (0.118)
Stage −0.09∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.15∗ −0.15∗ −0.15∗ −0.16∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.082) (0.098) (0.087)
Unilateral x Stage 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.648) (0.640) (0.718) (0.676) (0.557) (0.552) (0.470) (0.479)
Bilateral x Stage −0.03 −0.03 −0.04∗ −0.04 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16
(0.233) (0.282) (0.070) (0.112) (0.115) (0.122) (0.109) (0.118)
Match 0.35∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ −0.10 −0.14
(0.000) (0.003) (0.361) (0.312)
Unilateral x Match −0.12 −0.12 0.52∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.484) (0.000) (0.006)
Bilateral x Match −0.40∗∗ −0.40∗∗ 0.44∗ 0.42∗
(0.021) (0.031) (0.093) (0.068)
Constant −0.60∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ −1.45∗∗∗ −1.54∗∗∗ −2.25∗∗∗ −1.42∗∗∗ −1.92∗∗∗ −1.07
(0.002) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.164)
Included Matches 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10
Included Stages 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12
M-S Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Cluster VCE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 13: Robustness check on the inclusion of match-stage composition dummies. The
baseline case is the strong commitment treatment. Specifications 2 and 4 are the same as the
reported specifications, 1 and 3, but without the match-stage composition dummies. ∗∗∗1%,
∗∗5% ,∗10% significance.
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Substitutes Complements
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Unilateral 0.24 0.19 −0.94 −0.28 −0.01 1.04
(0.670) (0.680) (0.194) (0.670) (0.989) (0.214)
Bilateral 0.99∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ −0.07 −1.91 −1.42∗ −1.32
(0.038) (0.003) (0.899) (0.109) (0.076) (0.131)
Stage −0.08∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.15∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.10∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.004) (0.067)
Unilateral x Stage 0.01 0.03 0.12∗ 0.07 0.00 −0.09
(0.718) (0.358) (0.089) (0.470) (0.946) (0.287)
Bilateral x Stage −0.04∗ −0.02 0.08 0.17 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗
(0.070) (0.562) (0.215) (0.109) (0.003) (0.098)
Match 0.35∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ −0.09 −0.10 −0.05 0.23
(0.000) (0.000) (0.717) (0.361) (0.571) (0.326)
Unilateral x Match −0.12 −0.06 0.36 0.52∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ −0.03
(0.435) (0.527) (0.270) (0.000) (0.041) (0.921)
Bilateral x Match −0.40∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ 0.28 0.44∗ 0.14 0.15
(0.021) (0.009) (0.356) (0.093) (0.183) (0.697)
Constant −1.45∗∗∗ −1.97∗∗∗ −0.82 −1.92∗∗∗ −1.89∗∗∗ −2.38∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
Included Matches 7–10 4–10 4–6 7–10 4–10 4–6
Included Stages 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12
M-S Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster VCE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 14: Robustness check on the data sub-sample. The baseline case is the strong commit-
ment treatment. Specifications 2 and 3 are the same as the reported specification, 1, except
use the final two-thirds and the middle third sub-samples. ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5% ,∗10% significance.
Substitutes Complements
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Unilateral 0.24 (0.670) 0.02 (0.838) −0.28 (0.670) 0.02 (0.720)
Bilateral 0.99∗∗ (0.038) 0.05 (0.312) −1.91 (0.109) −0.09 (0.291)
Stage −0.08∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.02∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.15∗ (0.098) −0.01∗ (0.096)
Unilateral x Stage 0.01 (0.718) 0.00 (0.371) 0.07 (0.470) −0.01 (0.354)
Bilateral x Stage −0.04∗ (0.070) 0.00 (0.850) 0.17 (0.109) 0.01 (0.190)
Match 0.35∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.10 (0.361) 0.01 (0.593)
Unilateral x Match −0.12 (0.435) −0.01 (0.693) 0.52∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.07∗∗∗ (0.000)
Bilateral x Match −0.40∗∗ (0.021) −0.03 (0.237) 0.44∗ (0.093) 0.01 (0.786)
Constant −1.45∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.23∗∗∗ (0.000) −1.92∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.09∗ (0.061)
Included Matches 7–10 7–10 7–10 7–10
Included Stages 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12
M-S Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster VCE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 15: Robustness check on the regression model. The baseline case is the strong commit-
ment treatment. Specification 2 uses the same set of independent variables as the reported
specification, 1, except uses a linear random-effects model. ∗∗∗1%, ∗∗5% ,∗10% significance.
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Substitutes Complements
Machine Strong Unilateral Bilateral Strong Unilateral Bilateral
Uncond. coop. AAAA 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01
Cond. coop. ABC(C/D) 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.23 0.18
Nash reversion ACCC 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.08
Part. coll. + Nash rev. BBCC 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08
Nash CCCC 0.20 0.22 0.10 0.25 0.14 0.31
Myopic best repsonse DCCC 0.28 0.28 0.19
BCCC 0.29 0.21 0.25
Punishing DDDD 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other ——— 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.13 0.09
Table 16: Machine categorization: Distribution of machines in initial stages of matches 7–10
across treatments. For each category mentioned, machines (i) with Hamming distance at
most 1 from the machine mentioned, (ii) that are not named explicitly in the second column
(e.g. CCCC does not count towards DCCC) and (iii) do respond to collusion with the same
action as the machine mentioned (e.g. ADDD does not count towards DDDD) are counted.
Each machine is counted once and in case multiple categories apply, they are counted with
equal weight in these categories. The category “Other” includes all machines satisfying none
of the properties above.
Substitutes Complements
Machine Strong Unilateral Bilateral Strong Unilateral Bilateral
Uncond. coop. AAAA 0.77 0.06 0.46 0.58 0.02 0.71
(17,1) (6,3) (17,2) (7,1) (2,2) (5,1)
Cond. coop. ABC(C/D) 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.06
(31,10) (6,3) (26,8) (21,6) (29,12) (21,6)
Nash reversion ACCC 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03
(17,7) (8,5) (14,6) (3,3) (8,5) (3,2)
Part. coll. + Nash rev. BBCC 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.05
(1,1) (0,0) (1,1) (17,2) (3,2) (5,3)
Nash CCCC 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06
(43,6) (22,8) (2,2) (8,2) (2,2) (32,5)
Myopic best response DCCC 0.06 0.02 0.04
(19,5) (7,5) (10,5)
BCCC 0.03 0.04 0.43
(13,3) (12,6) (14,5)
Pun. myopic best resp. DCCD 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2,1) (0,0) (6,3) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
Punishing DDDD 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0,0) (0,0) (7,2) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
Table 17: Frequency of one-shot deviations conditional on the machine (matches 7–10; all
stages). In parentheses, the total number of deviations and the number of distinct individuals
deviating.
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Treatment Machine Collusion Dev.SC Nash Dev.SS Total
Substitutes
Strong AAAA 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 (17,1)
ABC(C/D) 0.52 0.03 0.29 0.16 (31,10)
ACCC 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.71 (17,7)
CCCC 0.81 0.09 0.00 0.09 (43,6)
DCCC 0.53 0.21 0.00 0.26 (19,5)
Unilateral CCCC 0.45 0.23 0.00 0.32 (22,8)
Bilateral AAAA 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.76 (17,2)
ABC(C/D) 0.35 0.15 0.19 0.31 (26,8)
Complements
Strong ABC(C/D) 0.43 0.29 0.05 0.24 (21,6)
BBCC 0.35 0.65 0.00 0.00 (17,2)
Unilateral ABC(C/D) 0.28 0.41 0.24 0.07 (29,12)
Bilateral ABC(C/D) 0.43 0.19 0.29 0.10 (21,6)
CCCC 0.63 0.38 0.00 0.00 (32,5)
Table 18: Choice after a one-shot deviation at different prominent machines (matches 7–10;
all stages). Machines with less than 15 one-shot deviations are not reported. In parentheses,
the total number of deviations and the number of distinct individuals deviating.
Machine Substitutes Complements
Uncond. coop. AAAA 0.05 0.04
Cond. coop. ABC(C/D) 0.01 0.01
Nash reversion ACCC 0.02 0.01
Part. coll. + Nash rev. BBCC 0.02 0.09
Nash CCCC 0.03 0.00
Myopic best response DCCC 0.03
BCCC 0.02
Punishing DDDD 0.06 0.00
Table 19: Frequency of a machine modification for unilateral commitment variation condi-
tional on machine (matches 7–10; all stages).
Machine Substitutes Complements
Uncond. coop. AAAA 0.46 0.71
Cond. coop. ABC(C/D) 0.02 0.00
Nash reversion ACCC 0.01 0.01
Part. coll. + Nash rev. BBCC 0.00 0.02
Nash CCCC 0.01 0.09
Myopic best response DCCC 0.03
BCCC 0.02
Punishing DDDD 0.03 0.00
Table 20: Frequency of attempts to a machine modification for bilateral commitment variation
conditional on machine (matches 7–10; all stages).
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Previous stage outcome Machine modification
Treatment Label Outcomes From To Total
Substitutes
Unilateral Failed collusion (A,B), (B,A) — — —
Miscoordination (A,C), (A,D), (B,C), (B,D) AAAA CCCC (3,2)
(A,C), (A,D), (B,C), (B,D) AAAA DCCC (2,2)
Punishment path (C,D), (D,C), (D,D) CCCC DDDD (2,2)
DDDD CCCC (3,3)
Bilateral Failed collusion (A,B), (B,A) — — —
Miscoordination (A,C), (A,D), (B,C), (B,D) AAAA — (11,3)
ABCD — (3,2)
ACCC — (3,3)
BCCC — (3,2)
Punishment path (C,D), (D,C), (D,D) AAAA — (11,3)
ABCD — (5,4)
ACCD — (6,3)
DDDD — (5,4)
Complements
Unilateral Failed collusion (A,B), (B,A) — — —
Miscoordination (A,C), (A,D), (B,C), (B,D) AAAA CCCC (3,2)
Punishment path (C,D), (D,C), (D,D) — — —
Bilateral Failed collusion (A,B), (B,A) — — —
Miscoordination (A,C), (A,D), (B,C), (B,D) ABCD — (2,2)
BBBB — (6,2)
Punishment path (C,D), (D,C), (D,D) — — —
Table 21: When and how machines are modified. Only prominent machines that were (at-
tempted to be) modified by at least two different individuals for a given type of history during
matches 4–10 are included. In the final column (total), the first number is the number of times
the particular machine was (attempted to be) modified; the second number is the number of
different individuals that contributed to that number.
Substitutes Complements
A B C D A B C D
Strong A 0.40 0.05 0.24 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.03
B 0.03 0.24 0.68 0.05 0.01 0.21 0.74 0.03
C 0.02 0.06 0.83 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.89 0.05
D 0.04 0.06 0.68 0.22 0.01 0.02 0.91 0.06
Unilateral A 0.35 0.04 0.23 0.38 0.52 0.32 0.16 0.01
B 0.08 0.21 0.64 0.07 0.08 0.31 0.57 0.04
C 0.06 0.05 0.76 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.78 0.09
D 0.07 0.01 0.68 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.60 0.27
Bilateral A 0.48 0.01 0.15 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.31 0.03
B 0.03 0.25 0.57 0.15 0.01 0.33 0.65 0.02
C 0.03 0.06 0.73 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.87 0.07
D 0.05 0.04 0.55 0.37 0.02 0.03 0.80 0.15
Table 22: Percent of machines in the initial stage (matches 7–10) replying to a−i in the
previous stage (rows) by ai in the current stage (columns).
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